UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

Anthony Michael Gioiosa, Sr.,

Plaintiff

v.

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Parole Results Continued,

Defendant

Case No.: 2:22-cv-00113-APG-EJY

Order

Plaintiff Anthony Michael Gioiosa, Sr. initiated this action by filing an untitled document. ECF No. 1-1. On January 26, 2022, the magistrate judge ordered Gioiosa to (1) submit a complaint and (2) file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay 12 the full \$402 filing fee by March 25, 2022. ECF No. 3. The magistrate judge warned Gioiosa 13 that the action could be dismissed if he failed to submit a complaint and file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay the full \$402 filing fee 15 for a civil action by that deadline. *Id.* at 3. That deadline expired and Gioiosa did not submit a complaint, file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full \$402 filing fee, or otherwise respond.

18|| **I**. **Discussion**

District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and "[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal" of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party's failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply

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with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); *Malone v. U.S. Postal Service*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must consider: (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. *See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Malone* v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)).

The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Gioiosa's claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. *See Anderson v. Air West*, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the court's need to consider dismissal. *See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives *before* the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); *accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that "the persuasive force of" earlier Ninth Circuit cases that "implicitly accepted pursuit of last drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court's order as satisfying this element[,]" *i.e.*, like the "initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]" have

been "eroded" by *Yourish*). Courts "need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before
finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives." *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed
until and unless Gioiosa submits a complaint and either files a fully complete application to

proceed *in forma pauperis* or pays the \$402 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to
enter a second order setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that
it often only delays the inevitable and squanders the court's finite resources. The circumstances
here do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Gioiosa needs
additional time or evidence that he did not receive the magistrate judge's order. Setting another
deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors
dismissal.

II. Conclusion

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Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of dismissal. I therefore order that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Gioiosa's failure to submit a complaint and file a fully complete application to proceed *in forma pauperis* or pay the full \$402 filing fee in compliance with the magistrate judge's January 26, 2022, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Gioiosa wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint and resolve the matter of the filing fee in a new case.

Dated: April 6, 2022

U.S. District Judge

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